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Abstract—We consider a cellular system with multiple Fem-
tocells operating in a Macrocell. They are sharing a set of
communication channels. Each Femtocell has multiple users
requiring certain minimum rate guarantees. Each channel has a
peak power constraint to limit interference to the Macro Base
Station (BS). We formulate the problem of channel allocation and
power control at the Femtocells as a noncooperative Game. We
develop decentralized algorithms to obtain a Coarse Correlated
equilibrium that satisfies the QoS of each user. If the QoS of all
the users cannot be satisfied, then we obtain a fair equilibrium.
Finally we also provide a decentralized algorithm to reach a
Pareto and a Nash Bargaining solution which has a much lower
complexity than the algorithm to compute the NE.
Keywords- Femtocell, QoS, game theory, decentralized al-
gorithms, Nash Bargaining.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently a significant fraction (80%) of traffic in the
cellular systems is being generated indoors. Out of this about
60% is voice traffic which requires a good quality of the
received voice. However, due to attenuations from the walls,
the quality of this voice will not be good unless the Base
station (BS) transmits at power levels which are no longer
legally allowed in many countries. Hence, femtocells ([4],
[11]) are being considered as an option.
A Femtocell (FC) is a small cell meant to cater to the
wireless users within a building. It consists of a Femtocell
Access Point (FAP), which is a low powered, small, inexpen-
sive base station deployed inside the building. It is connected
to a wireline network. If a Mobile Station (MS) is within the
building and encounters an outage from the main BS in the
cell (called Macro BS), it can be handed over to the FAP
deployed within the building. This improves the quality of
service (QoS) to the indoor applications and also offloads a
significant fraction of cellular traffic to the wireline network.
Although, deployment of FAPs in a macrocell (MC) en-
vironment improves the performance of the users inside the
FC, it causes interference to the MSs in the MC and adjacent
FCs. Therefore, to reap the benefits of a FC one needs careful
interference management ([35]). An upper limit must also be
imposed on the transmit power of the MSs within a FC.
Reducing the transit power in a FC will also help reduce
the carbon footprint of the cellular systems ([14], [31]). We
address this problem in this paper.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
3.
07
64
7v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
2 M
ar 
20
17
In the following we provide the related literature survey. A
good overview on the topic is provided in [4], [7], [26]. The
problem of power control and channel allocation among FCs
is addressed in [1], [36]. In [1] the authors try to admit as
many users as possible while in [36] QoS of delay sensitive
users is taken care of by ensuring them minimum rates.
A dynamic resource management scheme for LTE based
hybrid access FC is proposed in [18]. Multi-objective re-
source allocation for FC networks is proposed in [19]. In
[34], the authors have discussed cooperative distributed radio
resource management algorithms for time synchronisation,
carrier selection and power control for hyper-dense small cell
deployment. In [20], the authors propose a cognitive radio
resource management scheme for FCs to mitigate cross-tier
interference.
The problem of power control to different channels within
each FC via Game theory is addressed in [2], [3], [5], [15],
[17]. In [2] the aggregate throughput of FCs is considered and
Nash Equilibria (NE) obtained. In [3] a stackelberg game is
formulated. In [5] and [25] a Pareto point is obtained. The
problem of power control and channel allocation via game
theory is addressed in [8] and [29]. This problem is more
complex because of mixed integer programming involved.
[8] uses auction theory to do resource allocation while [29]
develops efficient distributed algorithms to obtain NE while
guaranteeing minimum rates to individual users. In [29] the
scenario when it is not possible to provide minimum rates to
individual users is also addressed by providing ’fair’ NE.
In this paper we continue to study the setup in [29].
As opposed to [29], we develop low complexity distributed
algorithms that can be used whether the QoS of the users are
satisfied or not. Also we develop algorithms for computing
Pareto optimal points and Nash bargaining solutions. These
were not obtained in [29]. We also show how our setup can be
extended when there are voice and data users in the system. As
against [5] and [25], we have multiple users in each FC. Thus
in [5] and [25], each considering one user only in each FC,
there is only the power allocation problem while we consider
power and channel allocation. Also, [25] does not have any
QoS requirements at the FCs. While [5] has a single channel
and considers an SINR requirement.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
mathematical model of the problem. Section III provides a
game theoretic framework and also provides efficient algo-
rithms for a Coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE). Section
IV provides an algorithm for a Pareto point and Section V
extends it to obtain a Nash Bargaining solution. Section VI
considers a system which has voice and data users and we
ensure QoS to the voice users. Section VII shows the efficacy
of the algorithms via a few examples. Section VIII concludes
the paper.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We consider a two tier cellular system in which within a
MC there may be many FCs. The cellular system has multiple
subchannels, perhaps using OFDMA (e.g., LTE/LTEA) and the
subchannels are shared by the FCs and the outdoor users in the
MC. The transmission between a FAP and its MSs may be in
the uplink or downlink or in both directions. The allocation of
channels and powers to different users will be done by the FAP
using the same algorithms (although the peak power constraint
in the two directions can be different for the same channel).
Thus, for simplicity we will consider down link only.
The MSs using a FC are also the MSs for the Macro BS.
Thus, these MSs can get the information from the Macro BS
about which subchannels are being used by the users in the
MC (e.g., from the DL/UL map in Wimax, PDCCH/PUCCH
in LTE sent by the MBS in each frame). The indoor MSs
can also sense the SINR in each subchannel and can further
be directed by the MBS on the maximum power they can
use in transmitting in different available subchannels. This
information can be sent to the FBS by the MSs within its
domain or by the MBS directly (see e.g., [37]). FBS uses
this information to decide on subchannel allocation and power
control within its FC to provide QoS to its users while
using minimum power within the limits prescribed by the
MBSs. Minimizing power reduces interference to other FCs
and to MSs outside. We assume a control channel via which
the different FCs can coordinate with each other and self
configure.
Let there be K FCs sharing N -subchannels deployed in a
MC. Each FC k consists of Mk users which have minimum
rate requirement R¯kj , j = 1, 2, ...,Mk. Each channel i has
maximum power constraint P¯ ki , i = 1, 2, ..., N in FC k. Let
Gki,j be the channel gain of i
th channel for jth user in FC k.
Let the interference from MC for user j in FC k on channel i
be Iki,j . We assume that the receiver noise variance σ
2 is same
for all FCs and channels (although this can also be different
and our setup will require no change for this). Let Gk,li,j be
channel gain at channel i for user j in FC k from FC l. Based
on this information, each FC k has to compute power P ki
allocated to each subchannel i and subchannel allocation Aki,j ,
where
Aki,j =
 1, if subchannel i is assigned to user j,0, otherwise,
such that the overall power used in the FC is minimized
while the users’ QoS is satisfied. Thus each FC k solves the
optimization problem,
min
N∑
i=1
P ki (1)
such that
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j ≥ R¯jk, ∀j = 1, 2, ...,Mk, (2)
P ki ≤ P¯ik, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N, (3)
Mk∑
j=1
Aki,j ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N. (4)
where Cki,j = log2
(
1 +
Pki G
k
i,j
Γ(σ2+Iki,j+
∑
l6=k G
l,k
i,jP
l
i )
)
is the trans-
mission rate for user j on channel i in FC k if channel j is
allocated to it and Γ is the SNR gap included for practical rates
achievable depending on the modulation and coding scheme
([6]).
Equation (2) specifies the minimum rate requirements, while
(3) specifies the power constraints on each channel. The
constraint (4) ensures that any subchannel is allocated to only
one user within a FC. Also, while trying to provide QoS to
each of its users, each FC also wants to minimize the total
power (1) it needs, to reduce the costs involved as well as to
address the green communication related issues ([14]). Since
the decisions made by each FC affect the decisions of other
FCs, we address this problem as a game.
III. GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION
A. Game formulation and solution
We formulate the game for our system as G =
〈I ,X , (Φk(x))k∈I 〉, where I = {1, 2, ...,K}, the set of
FCs is the set of players, X is the overall strategy space and
Φk is the utility of player k. Let P k = {P ki , i = 1, 2, ..., N}.
We define strategy set X = {(P k ∈ RN+ , Aki,j ∈ {0, 1}, k =
1, 2, ...,K) :
∑N
i=1 C
k
i,jA
k
i,j ≥ R¯jk, j = 1, 2, ...,Mk, P ki ≤
P¯i
k
,
∑Mk
j=1A
k
i,j ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, ..., N}. We are interested
in finding a decentralized energy efficient Nash Equilibrium
([30]) which provides QoS to each user in the system (if at
all possible). If it is not possible we provide a fair NE (to be
defined later).
Define the utility function for FC k by
Φk(x) = −
N∑
i=1
P ki ,∀x ∈X . (5)
Maximizing Φk(x) will minimize the total power used by FC
k. It is easy to verify that the game G defined above is an
exact Potential game ([23]) with Potential function
f(x) = −
K∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
P ki . (6)
We observe that X is a compact set. Also the potential
function f is continuous. Therefore, it has a global maximizer
and hence has a (generalized) NE ([12], [30]). In the following
we provide distributed algorithms to compute a NE.
Let
Dk(x−k) = {x∗k ∈Xk(x−k) : x∗k = arg maxxk Φk(xk, x−k)},
(7)
whereXk(x−k) is the set of strategies of k which are possible
when the strategies of all other users are x−k. The set Dk(x−k)
provides strategies for player k which maximize its utility
for a fixed strategy x−k by all other users. For a given x−k,
best response provides an element of Dk(x−k).
Let for an  > 0 and x−k,
Dk(x−k) = {x∗k ∈Xk(x−k) : Φk(x∗k, x−k) ≥ Φk(xk, x−k)+,
∀xk}. (8)
Then -Better Response provides a point in Dk(x−k).
For a potential game better response and -better response
based iterated algorithms usually converge. However, for our
problem the feasible strategy set of a player, due to (2) is
dependent on the strategies being played by the other players.
Therefore, for the resulting (generalized) NE the best response
dynamics may not converge [9].
The -Better Response algorithm obtains, at iteration n + 1,
at each FC k, k = 1, 2, ...,K,
xn+1k ∈ Dk(xn+11 , xn+12 , .., xn+1k−1 , xnk+1, .., xnK), (9)
and then passes on the -better response to FC k + 1.
Since the potential function is bounded and in the -better
response algorithm, the potential function increases by atleast
, it converges in a finite number of steps to an -Nash Point
([24]).
For computationally simple algorithms, we consider
random-better response (or random -better response) which
converges for the above potential game. These algorithms have
lower complexity per iteration. But for a continuous strategy
space one may need a large number of iterations. Thus, we
have developed a novel variation of these algorithms in [29]
which converges much faster. This algorithm assumes that
there are enough resources available in the system so that the
QoS of each user in each FC can be satisfied.
If the QoS of all the users in all the FCs cannot be satisfied
then we have developed a distributed algorithm in [29] to
obtain a “fair” NE. In this case, we try to satisfy the largest
fraction of QoS of all the users in each FC. In particular, for
each FC k we obtain power P k and subchannel allocation Ak
that
max αk (10)
such that
1
R¯kj
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j ≥ αk, ∀j = 1, 2, ...,Mk, (11)
For this problem, since Xk is compact and utility functions
αk are continuous, the game has a (mixed) NE (MNE) [10].
However, it is not a Potential game. In [29] we discretized
the powers and provided a regret matching algorithm based
on [13] which converges to a correlated equilibrium (CE) of
the discretized game. It can be shown that as the discretization
step goes to zero, the CE of the discretized game converges
to that of the original game([32], [33]).
When the QoS of all the users cannot be satisfied in each
FC, then αk of the solution is < 1 at least for some k. If it
can be satisfied, then we may see that at the solution point
αk ≥ 1 for all k. Thus, this setup can actually handle all the
cases.
B. Algorithms
1) Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: In this paper for the
problem (3)-(4), (10)-(11) we present another algorithm, based
on multiplicative weights algorithm [27]. This algorithm has
less computational complexity than the regret matching algo-
rithm but converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria
(CCE) instead of, to the set of correlated equilibria (CE).
Definition 1. A distribution σ on the set X =
∏K
k=1Xk of
strategies is a CCE[27] if for every player k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
and for every unilateral deviation x′k ∈Xk
Ex∼σ[Φk(x)] ≥ Ex∼σ[Φk(x′k, x−k)]
where x ∼ σ denotes that the overall strategy x has distri-
bution σ and on the right hand side x−k has the marginal
distribution from σ.
Since MNE ⊆ CE ⊆ CCE, CCE also exists for our problem.
Furthermore, the price of anarchy of CCE is shown to be no
worse than that of a pure NE for a reasonably large class of
games ([28]).
To obtain a CCE for our problem, we again discretize
the powers to obtain a finite game. For this finite game, the
algorithm to obtain a CCE is provided in Algorithm 1. In this
algorithm, we first use the multiplicative weights algorithm
(Algorithm 2) to obtain a CCE. If αk < 1 for some k then
we retain that solution. But we reduce (via KKT) the power
allocation of the users which are getting more rate than their
requirements, so that the overall powers are reduced and αk
of those users becomes 1. This will not reduce αk of others
users. But it can possibly increase αk of users with αk < 1
because their interference is reduced. If αk ≥ 1 for all k, then
we retain the channel allocation of all the FCs but play a power
game among the users to minimize the total sum powers while
making αk = 1 for each k.
Algorithm 1 Allocation Algorithm 1
1.Compute the CCE from Algorithm 2 (Algo-CCE).
2. If αk < 1 for some k then stop.
3. if(αk ≥ 1) for all k, then fix Aki,j for all (i, j) and play
power allocation game.
Algorithm 2 Algo-CCE
(a) Initialise W 0k (xk) = 1,∀xk ∈Xk and 0 <  < 12
(b) n ≥ 1
1) Play an action according to distribution pnk =
Wnk
Γnk
, where
Γnk =
∑
xk∈Xk W
n
k (xk)
2) Each player k receives a cost vector Cnk , where
Cnk (xk) = Ex−k∼pn−1−k [Ck(xk, x−k)],∀xk, where p
n−1
−k =∏
j 6=k p
n−1
j
3) For given cost vector Cnk , update W
n+1
k (xk) =
Wnk (xk)(1− )C
n
k (xk),∀xk ∈Xk
(c) Repeat (1), (2), (3) until convergence.
The power allocation game for (1)-(4) for fixed subchannel
allocation matrices Ak, to be used in Algorithm 1 is a
potential game with coupled constraints. Its generalized NE
exists because the utility function is convex, continuous and
the strategy space is convex ([30]). Thus, the best response
algorithm (which in this case can be obtained by solving the
KKT equations) converges ([30]).
To execute Algorithm 2, the FCs have to exchange their
mixed strategies with each other. The algorithm works whether
all FCs update their strategies simultaneously or sequentially.
Algorithm 2 is written for cost functions between [0, 1].
Therefore, instead of taking αk as the utility to maximize,
we take Ck(αk) = 1 − 2αk + α2k as the cost to minimize. If
αk ≤ 2 then this function has a unique minimum at αk = 1,
the point we want to obtain. From either side of 1, this function
monotonically decreases towards 1. Since we are trying to
minimize power while satisfying QoS of different users, if
αk > 2 is possible, we can reduce P¯ ki of that FC such that
αk ≤ 2, without sacrificing performance.
Another way to address our problem is via penalty function
approach. For ρ > 0, consider the cost function
Ck(xk, x−k) =
N∑
i=1
P ki + ρ
Mk∑
j=1
max{0, R¯jk −
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j}.
(12)
For this game also, the strategy space Xk = {(P k ∈
RN+ , A
k
i,j ∈ {0, 1} : 0 ≤ P ki ≤ P¯ ki ,
∑Mk
j=1A
k
i,j ,≤ 1 i =
1, 2, ..., N} is compact and the cost function Ck(xk, x−k) is
continuous. Hence the game has (mixed) NE[10].
To apply Algorithm 1, we consider the normalised cost
αknor =
1
ρ+ 1
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
P ki
P¯i
k
)+
ρ
Mk
Mk∑
j=1
(
max{0, R¯jk −
∑N
i=1 C
k
i,jA
k
i,j}
R¯j
k
)
)
. (13)
We will call this Algorithm 2A.
For this problem formulation, we do not need to play a
power game after the CCE is obtained because when αk ≥ 1
for all k, due to the cost function chosen, for reasonable values
of ρ, the rates obtained for the different users will not be
substantially more than R¯ki . Thus we can use Algorithm 2
only. However, the CCE for (10) will generally be fair (within
a FC) when the QoS are not satisfied while for the present
formulation it may be less likely.
We will compare the solutions obtained by Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2A in section VII.
IV. PARETO OPTIMAL POINTS
The CCE obtained from the above algorithms (Algorithms
1-2, 2A) may not provide good overall system performance.
Thus, in the following, we also develop a distributed algorithm
for computation of a Pareto optimal point.
Definition 2. ([16], [22]) A decision vector x∗ ∈X is Pareto
optimal if there does not exist another decision vector x ∈X
such that Φk(x) ≥ Φk(x∗),∀k = 1, 2, ...,K and Φj(x) >
Φj(x∗) for at least one index j = 1, 2, ...,K.
Let, for βk > 0, k = 1, 2, ...,K,
Φ(x) =
K∑
k=1
βkΦk(xk, x−k). (14)
A global optimal point of Φ is a Pareto point [22].
Now we take Φk = min(1, αk), where αk has been defined
as before. The reason for choosing min(1, αk) instead of αk
is that taking αk will allow the possibility of the Pareto point
to maximize the sum of the α’s while some αk may be strictly
less than 1, even when it was possible to satisfy the QoS of
all the users. This will not happen with the modified utility
function.
Since the strategy space X =
∏K
k=1Xk is compact and
each Φk for our problem is continuous, Φ has a global
maximum and hence a Pareto point. The same can be said
about the cost function (Ck = −Φk).
As in case of CCE, if we have enough resources to satisfy
the QoS of all the users in each FC, then we will get αk = 1
for all the FCs. Now the rates received by some of the users
may be more than needed and hence the powers used by an FC
may be more than needed. Thus, now as per the CCE case we
keep the channel allocations fixed and play the power game
to reduce the powers needed by each FC. Being a potential
game, it also provides a Pareto point.
Instead of using (10), we can also use (12) to get Pareto
points. Now, as said for CCE, we will not need to play a power
game later on. Thus, the complexity to obtain the Pareto point
is less. However, we expect that Pareto point obtained via (10)
fairer solution within a FC (higher αk). We will see this in
example provided in the section VII.
To obtain a global optimal of (14) in our distributed setup
we use the following algorithm. We descretize the power
levels. Then the overall strategy space becomes a finite set.
We use Algorithm 3 below to get its global optimal. If each
Φk is continuous and the strategy space is compact, then we
can easily show that for each  > 0 there is a discretization
of state space for which the global optimal is within  of the
global optimal of Φ.
In Algorithm 3, each user updates its strategy as follows. It
picks randomly, uniformly one of its channels and changes its
allocation randomly, to one of the other users. Power allocation
to all the channels are randomly, uniformly picked from the
discrete set. If at these new strategies of all the FCs, Φ(x)
increases, then the users update to the new strategy; otherwise
they retain the previous one.
We can modify Algorithm 3 by changing the first step to
change the allocation of all the channels (instead of only one
of the channels), uniformly to the users. We call this Algorithm
3M.
Proposition 1 below shows that Algorithm 3M converges
to a Pareto point with probability 1. However, Algorithm 3,
which is a heuristic (e.g., does not guarantee convergence to
a Pareto point) often obtains the Pareto point much faster
than Algorithm 3M. We will show this in section VII via
examples. The reason for this is that Algorithm 3 does local
stochastic search instead of global stochastic search. Global
search ensures convergence but since it searches over a much
larger space, it can be very slow in finding better strategies.
However, the local search can get struck into local optima. But
in our setup, this local search is not so local (due to multiple
users and FCs) and hence chances of our obtaining a global
optimum are high. Indeed in most of the cases we considered
we obtained the global optimum.
Proposition 1. The number of steps needed by Algorithm 3M
to reach a Pareto optimal point x∗ with probability ≥ 1−  is
n ≤ log 
log(1− 1M )
,
where  ∈ (0, 1] and M = |X |, the cardinality of X . Also,
P [R <∞] = 1, where R is the number of steps to reach x∗.
Proof. Let x ∈X be picked with uniform distribution. Then,
P (R ≤ n) =
n∑
i=1
1
M
(1− 1
M
)i−1
= 1− (1− 1
M
)n. (15)
Hence, P [R < ∞] = limn→∞ P [R ≤ n] = 1. Also, for any
given  ∈ (0, 1], probability of hitting x∗ in n steps is ≥ 1−,
if
1− (1− 1
M
)n ≥ 1− 
which implies, n ≤ log 
log(1− 1M )
.
From (15), R has a finite exponential moment.
In this algorithm (3 or 3M), the random updates of all the
users are taken into account together and Φ is computed by
each user and the new strategy is decided. Thus, each user
needs to know the new updated strategy of all users, as for the
NE before but also their utility functions. Alternately, all users
send their new strategy to one of the users or a central observer
who computes Φ and announces to all whether to keep the new
update or the previous. The computational complexity of this
algorithm is much less than that of Algorithm 2 because of
the expected value computation in Algorithm 2.
We can also add a termination condition. If the strategy xn
stays same for N1 > 0 consecutive iterations, we stop. The
probability that we stop at the global optimum increases with
N1.
The Pareto point obtained here may have some fairness
issues, i.e., although the point obtained maximizes Φ, some
player may get larger αk than others. This can be ad-
justed by picking Pareto points which are also Nash bar-
gaining solutions [21]. Such solutions are discussed below.
Algorithm 3 Algo-Pareto 1
Initialization: All the FCs k = 1, 2, ...,K will pick an arbitrary
strategy denoted by x0 ∈X and exchange with each other.
1. Each FC k picks one of the channels randomly and
reallocates to one of the users uniformly at random. Then it
randomly reallocates its powers to each channel. Let the new
overall strategy be denoted by x. Then,
xn =
{
x, if (Φ(x) > Φ(xn−1)),
xn−1, otherwise.
2. Repeat until converges or the termination criterion is met.
V. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION
In addition to not being fair, usually there are multiple
Pareto points. As opposed to this, a Nash Bargaining ([21])
solution guarantees a fair, Pareto optimal solution which is
unique. The following theorem provides existence of a Nash
Bargaining solution.
Theorem 1. ([21]) Let the set of possible payoffs F ⊆ RK be
a closed, convex set. Let αˆ = (αˆ1, αˆ2, ..., αˆK) be the payoffs
that the players would expect if they did not cooperate. Assume
that {α ∈ F : αk ≥ αˆk,∀k ∈ I } is a nonempty bounded set.
Also assume that there exists some α ∈ F such that αk >
αˆk,∀k. Then there exists a unique α ≥ αˆ that maximizes
∏
k∈I
(αk − αˆk), (16)
which is the Nash Bargaining Solution of the problem.

We consider the problem in (10)-(11) for computation of
Nash Bargaining solution. A feasible pay off allocation is F =
{α = (α1, α2, ..., αK) : 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1,∀k} which is a closed,
convex set. Also consider αˆ such that there is a feasible α >
αˆ. Then from the above Theorem 1 we have a unique Nash
Bargaining solution Φ(F, αˆ). Equation (16) can be rewritten
as (by taking logarithm)
Φ(F, αˆ) ∈ arg max
α∈F,αk≥αˆk,∀k
∑
k∈I
log(αk − αˆk).
In order to avoid a non-positive number within logarithm,we
consider
Φ(F, αˆ) ∈ arg max
α∈F,αk≥αˆk,∀k
∑
k∈I
log(c+ αk − αˆk) (17)
where c > 0 is appropriately chosen. We use Algorithm 3/3M
to compute the Nash Bargaining Solution via (17).
αˆ should be carefully chosen. We can take αˆ = 0. We can
also choose it as a NE or according to some QoS requirement.
VI. COEXISTENCE OF VOICE AND DATA USERS
In this section we consider the case where each FC k may
have data users and voice users. We extend our algorithms
developed above to this scenario and compute a CCE, a Pareto
optimal point and a Nash Bargaining solution.
Let Dk be the set of data users and V k be the set of voice
users. We consider the following modified problem. At each
FC k,
max αk (18)
such that
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j ≥ αkR¯kj , ∀j ∈ Dk, (19)
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j ≥ R¯kj , ∀j ∈ V k, (20)
and Mk∑
j=1
Aki,j ≤ 1, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N. (21)
Equation (19) specifies that a largest fraction of the QoS of
data users are satisfied and equation (20) specifies that QoS
of voice users are fully satisfied. Since voice users require
much less rate, the network will often have enough resources
to satisfy (19).
To obtain a CCE for this problem we use the algorithms
of Section III only but change the utilities αk of FC k as
follows: if at a given power and channel allocation, the rate
of any of its voice users is not satisfied, then we make its
αk = 0; otherwise compute it as in Section III based on data
users only. This will ensure that if an FC has a positive utility,
the rate requirements of all its voice users is satisfied.
Next we consider the Pareto points. Using the modified αk
given above does not always provide a solution with stochastic
local search. It can be made to work if we carefully tailor our
stochastic local search to the constraints. Thus, instead, we
consider penalty function method corresponding to eq. (12).
Combining equations (19) and (20), as in equation (12) we
consider
1
|V k|
∑
j∈V k
min{ 1
R¯kj
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j , 1}+ min
j∈Dk
{ 1
R¯kj
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j}
≥ 1 + αk. (22)
and Algorithm 2A to obtain a CCE.
Next we consider LHS of equation (22) as Φk and obtain
a Pareto optimal solution from equation (14) and Algorithm 3
and 3M. Also, Φk is closed and convex. Hence it has a Nash
Bargaining solution. By considering αk = Φk in equation (17),
we obtain a Nash Bargaining Solution. For all voice and data
users (whose QoS is satisfied) at their allocated channels we
can minimize power using KKT conditions while ensuring that
their rate requirements are satisfied.
From equation (12), we formulate equations (18)-(21) as,
Ck(xk, x−k) =
N∑
i=1
P ki + ρ
∑
j∈Dk
max{0, R¯jk −
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j}
+ ρ
∑
j∈V k
max{0, R¯jk −
N∑
i=1
Cki,jA
k
i,j} (23)
Using equation (23) and (14), we obtain Pareto optimal points.
VII. EXAMPLES
In this section we consider a system with 2 FCs each with
2 users and 4 subchannels deployed in a MC. We consider
Time Division Duplex (TDD) scenario where all parameters,
such as rate requirements, interference matrix and subchannel
gain matrices do not change significantly within a given TDD
duration. We use the following parameters:
Subchannel bandwidth B = 180kHz, SNR Gap Γ =
1, Noise Power N0 = 1 ∗ 10−9W, Noise variance
σ2 = N0B = 1.8 ∗ 10−4watt-sec, ρ = 15, βk = 1 for
k = 1, 2.
Subchannel gain matrices; G1, G2, G1,2, G2,1 were
obtained by sampling from Gaussian distributions
N (1, 1),N (0.5, 1),N (0, 1),N (0, 1) and taking square.
The interference matrices (mw) are
I1 =

4 3
11 4
8 9
9 13

, I2 =

10 1
11 6
6 1
1 14

Maximum powers (mw) allocated to the subchannels are,
P¯ 1 = [2.1, 1.2, 8.0, 1.8], P¯ 2 = [1.1, 1.5, 7.5, 1.9].
Rate requirements of the users, in kbps, in the two FC are,
R¯1 = [200, 220], R¯2 = [160, 180].
Fig. 1. Example 1, Correlated Equilibrium using Algorithm-3 of [29].
We have verified that the rate requirement of all the users
cannot be satisfied for this case. Thus, we obtain a fair NE
via Algorithm 3 (regret matching) of [29]. There are multiple
NE. Depending on the initial conditions, the algorithm may
converge to a different NE. We show the convergence of
this algorithm in Fig 1. We have observed that the regret
algorithm converges to the same NE in this example even
though we started with different initial conditions. For this
NE, the subchannel allocation for the two FC’s converges
to CA1 = [2, 1, 1, 1], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2] and the power
allocations are P 1(in mw)= [2.1, 1.2, 8.0, 1.8], P 2(in mw)=
[1.1, 1.5, 7.5, 1.9] with the utilities αk as 0.4294, 0.6348 and
the allocated rates (in kbps) [85.8, 97.9], [123.5, 114.2].
Using the multiplicative weights Algorithm (Algorithm 1),
we obtain the same CCE. The convergence of utilities is shown
in Fig 2.
For cost (13), using Algorithm 2A, we get a CCE with the
subchannel allocations CA1 = [2, 2, 1, 1], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2]
and the power allocations P 1(in mw)= [2.1, 1.2, 8.0, 1.8],
P 2(in mw)= [1.1, 1.5, 7.5, 1.9] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[78.1, 106.4], [123.5, 114.2]. Convergence of the algorithm is
shown in Fig 3. We see that compared to the CCE obtained
via (10), this CCE is less fair (in terms of fraction of rates
obtained) to the users in FC 1.
Fig. 2. Example 1, CCE using Algorithm-1 for problem (10).
Fig. 3. Example 1, CCE using Algorithm-2A for problem (13).
It is observed from Figs 1, 2 and 3 that time taken to
converge to a CE by using Algorithm 3 of [29] is larger
(around 1300 iterations) as compared to the CCE computation
using Algorithm 1 (around 200 iteration for problem 10
and around 400 iteration for problem 13, Algorithm 2A).
Moreover, computations per iteration for Algorithms 1 and
2A are much less than for Algorithm 3 of [29].
Convergence to a Pareto optimal point for utilities αk,
obtained using Algorithm 3 for (10)-(11) is shown in Fig 4. At
this point the subchannel allocations are CA1 = [2, 2, 1, 1],
CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2] and the power allocations are P 1(in
mw)= [1.4, 1.2, 8.0, 1.8], P 2(in mw)= [1.1, 1.5, 7.5, 1.9] with
allocated rates (in kbps) [78.1, 77.7], [123.5, 125.9] with utili-
Fig. 4. Example 1, Pareto Optimal using Algorithm-3 for problem (10).
Fig. 5. Example 1, Pareto Optimal using Algorithm-3M for problem (12)with
uniform channel selection.
ties [0.3532, 0.6994].
Convergence to a Pareto optimal point for utili-
ties αk, obtained using Algorithm 3M for (10)-(11) is
shown in Fig 5. At this point the subchannel alloca-
tions are CA1 = [2, 2, 1, 1], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2] and the
power allocations are P 1(in mw)= [1.4, 1.2, 8.0, 1.2], P 2(in
mw)= [1.1, 1.5, 7.5, 1.9] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[70.7, 77.7], [123.5, 126.0] with utilities [0.3532, 0.70]. It is
observed that this algorithm takes around 5.5× 105 iterations
to converge to a Pareto optimal while Algorithm 3 took around
0.9× 104 iterations. We ran both the algorithms several times
and found that Algorithm 3M almost always took much longer
to converge.
Convergence to a Pareto optimal point obtained using
Fig. 6. Example 1, Pareto point using Algorithm-3 for problem (12).
Algorithm 3 for (12) with ρ = 5 is shown in Fig
6. We get a Pareto optimal point with subchannel allo-
cations CA1 = [2, 1, 1, 2], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 1] and the
power allocations are P 1(in mw)= [2.1, 0.8, 8.0, 0.0], P 2(in
mw)= [1.1, 1.5, 5.0, 1.9] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[74.8, 97.9], [177.6, 87.8]. The corresponding αk obtained is
[0.3740, 0.4878]. This Pareto point is less fair in FC2, com-
pared to the Pareto point obtained via (10).
Utilities obtained via Nash Bargaining solutions with
αˆ = {0.42, 0.42} using (17) are shown in Fig 7.
The subchannel allocation is CA1 = [2, 2, 1, 1], CA2 =
[2, 2, 1, 2] and the power allocations are P 1(in mw)=
[2.1, 0.8, 8.0, 1.8], P 2(in mw)= [1.1, 1.0, 5.0, 1.9] with allo-
cated rates (in kbps) [92.3, 103.8], [88.5, 106.2] with utilities
[0.3532, 0.6994]. Here, we observe that power allocated in FC
2 is reduced.
It is observed that for (10-11), α1 + α2 at the Pareto point
is 1.0526, which is larger than that of the Nash Bargaining
solution obtained, with 1.0146. Also, |α1−α2| at NB solution
is 0.0916 but for the Pareto point is 0.3423. This indicates
that NB solution is a fairer solution than a Pareto point. The
Pareto point for (12) provides α1 +α2 = 0.8618 which is less
compared to the Pareto point obtained via (10-11).
Fig. 7. Example 1, Nash Bargaining solution using Algorithm-3 for problem
(17).
Next we consider an example when the QoS of all the
users in both the FCs can be satisfied. We generated the
subchannel gain matrices G1, G2, G1,2, G2,1 as before. The
interference matrices (mw) are
I1 =

11 13
3 14
7 8
10 2

, I2 =

2 10
7 11
6 4
9 10

Maximum powers (mw) allocated to the subchannels are,
P¯ 1 =
[
15, 15, 15, 15
]
, P¯ 2 =
[
15, 15, 15, 15
]
.
Rate requirement of the users, in kbps, are,
R¯1 =
[
225, 100
]
, R¯2 =
[
200, 150
]
.
For the problem (10)-(11) using Algorithm 1, we obtain a
CCE with the following specifications. The convergence of
utilities is shown in Fig 8. The subchannel allocation is CA1 =
[1, 1, 2, 1], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2] and the power allocations are
P 1(in mw)= [15, 0, 8.8, 13.2], P 2(in mw)= [0, 0, 9.2, 11.8].
Now αk = 1 for both the FCs and the allocated rates are
same as the required rates. Total allocated powers (in mw) in
Fig. 8. Example 2, CCE using Algorithm-1 for eq (10).
Fig. 9. Example 2, CCE using Algorithm-1 for eq (13).
each FC are 37.0, 21.0 respectively.
Similarly, for the problem (13), we obtained a CCE with
subchannel allocations CA1 = [1, 1, 2, 1], CA2 = [2, 2, 1, 2],
power allocations P 1(in mw)= [15, 5, 10, 10], P 2(in
mw)= [5, 0, 10, 10] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[273.2, 111.0], [207.7, 151.6]. Total allocated powers (in
mw) in the two FCs are 40.0, 25.0. The convergence of the
utilities is shown in Fig 9.
It is observed that CCEs obtained via (10) and (13) give the
same channel allocation, whereas power allocation is slightly
different. This is because for (10) we do power control using
the obtained channel allocation.
For the problem (10)-(11) using Algorithm 3, we obtain
Fig. 10. Example 2, Pareto point using Algorithm-3, eq (10).
the Pareto point with the convergence plot shown in Fig
10. The Pareto point has subchannel allocations CA1 =
[1, 1, 2, 1], CA2 = [1, 2, 2, 1] and the power allocations P 1 =
[9.6, 13.3, 9.9, 0.0], P 2 = [0.0, 0.0, 9.5, 10.0] with the allo-
cated rates same as the required rates. Total allocated powers
(in mw) are 32.9, 19.5. We see that these powers are less than
for the two CCEs obtained above.
Utilities of the Pareto points obtained via (12) with ρ = 5
are shown in Fig 11. The subchannel allocation is CA1 =
[1, 1, 2, 2], CA2 = [1, 2, 1, 2] and the power allocations are
P 1(in mw)= [10, 10, 10, 0], P 2(in mw)= [0, 0, 10, 15] with
allocated rates (in kbps) [227.0, 111.0], [207.7, 201.3]. The
total sum power in the system is a little higher than in the
above Pareto point but lower than those in the two CCEs
above.
Voice and Data Users:
Next we consider a system with 2 FCs, each with 2 voice
users and 1 data user (for FC 1, {2, 3} are voice users and
{1} is data user; for FC 2, {1, 3} are voice users and {2} is
data user) and 4 subchannels. We generated the subchannel
gain matrices G1, G2, G1,2, G2,1 as before. The interference
matrices (in mw) are
Fig. 11. Example 2, Pareto point using Algorithm-3, eq (12).
I1 =

10 6 6
3 9 12
1 11 12
9 5 3

, I2 =

10 7 5
1 5 2
7 10 8
7 11 3

Maximum powers (mw) allocated to the subchannels are,
P¯ 1 =
[
2.5, 1.3, 5.0, 1.6
]
,
P¯ 2 =
[
2.1, 1.0, 3.6, 1.7
]
.
Rate requirements of the users, in kbps, are,
R¯1 =
[
220, 25, 17
]
, R¯2 =
[
15, 180, 30
]
.
Convergence of utilities for CCE is shown in Fig 12.
At the equilibrium point, subchannel allocation for FCs
are CA1 = [1, 2, 1, 3], CA2 = [2, 3, 2, 1] and the al-
located powers are P 1(in mw)= [2.5, 0.3, 5.0, 0.2], P 2(in
mw)= [2.1, 0.3, 3.6, 0.5] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[211.23, 25.06, 17.59], [15.19, 122.9, 35.6]. The utilities are
α1 = 0.9601 and α2 = 0.6828. The total allocated power
are 8.0, 6.6.
Utilities of the Pareto points obtained for LHS of (22)
Fig. 12. Example 3, CCE for voice and data user.
Fig. 13. Example 3, Pareto point using Algorithm-3, eq (22).
using equation (14) and Algorithm 3 are shown in Fig 13.
The subchannel allocation is CA1 = [1, 2, 1, 3], CA2 =
[2, 3, 2, 1] and the power allocations are P 1(in mw)=
[1.7, 0.3, 5.0, 0.2], P 2(in mw)= [2.1, 0.3, 3.6, 0.5] with allo-
cated rates (in kbps) [205.0, 25.04, 17.04], [15.5, 123.9, 35.6].
The utilities are α1 = 0.9318 and α2 = 0.6883.
Utilities of the Pareto points obtained for (23) using
equation (14) and Algorithm 3 are shown in Fig 14.
The subchannel allocation is CA1 = [1, 2, 1, 3], CA2 =
[2, 3, 2, 1] and the power allocations are P 1(in mw)=
[2.5, 0.3, 5.0, 0.2], P 2(in mw)= [2.1, 0.3, 3.6, 0.5] with allo-
cated rates (in kbps) [211.2, 25.04, 17.06], [15.1, 122.2, 35.9].
Also, α1 = 0.9601, α2 = 0.6789. Now the total power used
Fig. 14. Example 3, Pareto point using Algorithm-3, eq (23).
is more than that of the above Pareto point.
Utilities of the Nash Bargaining solution with αˆ =
{1.4, 1.4} obtained for LHS of (22) using equation
(17) is shown in Fig 15. The subchannel allocation
is CA1 = [1, 2, 1, 3], CA2 = [2, 3, 2, 1] and the
power allocations are P 1(in mw)= [2.5, 0.3, 5.0, 0.2], P 2(in
mw)= [2.1, 0.3, 3.6, 0.6] with allocated rates (in kbps)
[211.23, 25.06, 17.31], [15.8, 122.25, 35.62]. It is observed that
the rates allocated to the data users are almost same as that
obtained via the Pareto optimal point obtained using LHS of
(22). This solution does not improve fairness compared to
the above CCE and Pareto points. Thus, to improve fairness,
we changed (αˆ1, αˆ2) to higher values. But it still did not
improve the fairness. Taking (αˆ1, αˆ2) larger either gives the
same solution or makes it infeasible.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered a channel and power allocation problem
in a multiple FC environment when there are multiple users
in each FC requiring different minimum rates. The channels
need to be shared by the different FCs such that they do
not cause much interference to each other and to the MC
users. We have formulated the problem in a non-cooperative
game theory setup and provided low complexity distributed
Fig. 15. Example 3, Nash Bargaining solution using Algorithm-3, eq (22).
algorithms to obtain coarse correlated equilibria. We have also
provided a distributed algorithm to obtain Pareto points and
Nash bargaining solutions. For the Pareto points (also for the
NB solution) we have also obtained a powerful low complexity
heuristic. Finally we have extended these algorithms to a
system with voice and data users, when the voice users are
guaranteed their rates.
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